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I appreciate the invitation to deliver the Dunwody Lecture this year,
and I am grateful that this occasion has allowed me to visit, for the first
time, one of the premier law schools in this Circuit and our nation. The
Levin College of Law enjoys an excellent reputation for the education of
lawyers. It is the alma mater of three judges of our court, and each year top
graduates of this college serve our court with distinction as law clerks.
I hope this visit will be the first of many to come for me.
My topic today is judicial modesty, which some critics of the
federal judiciary might say is an oxymoron. After all, these critics, in

* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. I thank Ed Whelan
and my law clerks for helpful comments about an earlier draft of this Lecture.
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recent years, have dubbed it “the imperial judiciary,”1 “the most dangerous
branch,”2 and “our judicial oligarchy.”3 Modesty is not a typical charge
against the federal courts.
This problem is not new. As far back as the early nineteenth century,
the federal judiciary has had its critics. As historian Forrest McDonald has
explained, “To most Jeffersonians, the federal judiciary stood as a barrier
to the realization of the kind of society they envisioned for America . . . .”4
Thomas Jefferson described the judiciary as “[t]he great object of my
fear,”5 and he may have been the first to call it “the most dangerous”6
branch. He mocked the federal judiciary as “our foreign department.”7
Even in the eyes of the contemporary legal profession, the federal
judiciary still often suffers from a reputation for pomposity and even
arrogance. Consider the popularity of a parody sung by a group of lawyers
from Austin, Texas, who moonlight as musicians and call themselves “The
Bar and Grill Singers.”8 They entertain audiences at bar conferences with
a tune entitled “Appointed Forever,”9 which is a remake of the song
“Happy Together”10 by The Turtles. It begins,
Imagine me as God. I do.
I think about it day and night.
It feels so right.
To be a federal district judge and know that I’m
Appointed forever.11
The chorus is even funnier and more biting:
1. See, e.g., MATTHEW J. FRANCK, AGAINST THE IMPERIAL JUDICIARY: THE SUPREME COURT
VS. THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE (1996); Edwin Meese III, The Imperial Judiciary—And What

Congress Should Do About It, POL’Y REV., Jan.–Feb. 1997, available at http://www.hoover.org/
publications/policyreview/3574172.html; Charles Krauthammer, Our Imperial Judiciary, TIME,
Dec. 4, 2000, at 46, available at http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,998639,00.html.
2. See, e.g., Simon Lazarus, The Most Dangerous Branch?, ATLANTIC, June 2002, at 24,
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/print/200206/lazarus.
3. Robert H. Bork, Our Judicial Oligarchy, in THE END OF DEMOCRACY?: THE JUDICIAL
USURPATION OF POLITICS 10 (Mitchell S. Muncy ed., 1997).
4. FORREST MCDONALD, THE PRESIDENCY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 81 (1976).
5. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane (Mar. 9, 1821), in 15 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 325, 326 (Albert Ellery Bergh & Andrew A. Lipscomb eds., 1st mem’l ed.
1903).
6. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Admantios Coray (Oct. 31, 1823), in 15 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 5, at 480, 486–87.
7. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston (Mar. 25, 1825), in 16 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 5, at 112, 113.
8. See The Bar & Grill Singers, http://www.barandgrillsingers.com (last visited Sept. 1,
2008).
9. THE BAR AND GRILL SINGERS, Appointed Forever, on LICENSED TO GRILL (1997).
10. THE TURTLES, Happy Together, on HAPPY TOGETHER (White Whale Records 1967).
11. THE BAR AND GRILL SINGERS, supra note 9.
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I’m a federal judge and I’m smarter than you.
For all my life.
I can do whatever I want to do.
For all my life.12
Contrast the reputation of the federal judiciary reflected in this musical
parody with the sober requests of leading federal judges, in recent years,
for an age of judicial modesty. This desire has been expressed by both
Chief Justice John Roberts, Jr. and Circuit Judge Richard Posner. Their
call has been widely praised.13
I too welcome the call for an age of judicial modesty, and when you
consider the contrast between the judiciary and the political branches,
there is plenty about our unique branch that lends itself to the virtue of
modesty. While judges shun cameras and microphones and protest
legislative attempts to allow those implements of the news media into
courtrooms, political officers rarely miss an opportunity to appear on
broadcasts of the mass media. While politicians use the time-honored tool
of a press conference, judges communicate through written opinions often
published almost anonymously as “per curiam.” While politicians are
watched closely for their appearances and fashions, judges are rarely seen
by the public and then only at an elevated distance dressed in plain black
robes.
Early on, Chief Justice John Marshall shunned political controversy
when he wore a black robe as a statement of the need for judicial modesty.
A biographer of Marshall, Jean Edward Smith, explained that Marshall led
by example when he took the oath of office in February 1801:
Breaking with tradition, he wore a plain black robe in the
republican fashion of the judges of the Virginia court of
appeals. The other justices, Cushing, Chase, and
Washington, were attired either in the traditional scarlet
and ermine of the King’s Bench or their individual
academic gowns—the “party-colored robes” of an
oppressive judiciary, in the words of Senator Stevens
Thomson Mason. By wearing black, Marshall was making
a quiet statement. He had seen the Federalists self-destruct
electorally through an excess of hubris, and he recognized
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Stuart Taylor Jr., In Praise of Judicial Modesty, NAT’L J., Mar. 18, 2006, at 13,
available at http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/ nj_20060318_3.php?related=true&story1
=null&story2=null&story3=null (discussing the arguments and three specific examples given by
Circuit Judge Richard Posner illustrating both judicial modesty and immodesty); Editorial, Confirm
Samuel Alito, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2006, at B6 (“The institutional self-discipline and modesty that
both Judge Alito and Chief Justice Roberts profess could do the court good if taken seriously and
applied apolitically.”).
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that the Court was on shaky ground. Why flaunt the colors
of the English judiciary when the black robes worn by
Pendleton and Wythe would do just as well? The decision
had symbolic importance, but the chief justice had another
motive. Marshall was a small-r republican and he was
uncomfortable with trappings of power.14
I draw the contrast of the judiciary with the political branches not as a
critic of politicians but as a former politician who respects their vital work.
The officers of the political branches are not stewards of modest power;
they develop national policies and must remain accessible and accountable
to the people. When the judicial role of applying the law fairly and
impartially is contrasted with the power and energy of the elected
branches, the judiciary should be considered the modest branch.
To be sure, there are routine practices of our peculiar branch that
suggest the judiciary routinely succumbs to the temptation to be immodest.
After all, there is a courtroom decorum that requires everyone to stand
when judges enter the room, lawyers to call judges “Your Honor,” and
invocations for God to save the judiciary as a bulwark of our free nation.
These ceremonial rituals are intended as signs of respect for the judiciary
itself, but perhaps they add to a reputation for haughtiness.
In the interest of contributing to the improvement of our reputation,
even though that reputation, on balance, is still deservedly good, I will
attempt to explain some qualities of judicial modesty and suggest ways of
promoting this virtue. Unlike the recent expressions of Chief Justice
Roberts and Judge Posner, my perspective does not concern how the
Supreme Court should interpret the Constitution. I will leave that
important issue to other commentators who already provide it plenty of
attention. I will instead apply what both the Chief Justice and Judge Posner
have said about the rudiments of judicial modesty to aspects of the federal
judiciary that are more parochial. As the most junior member of the Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, my vantage is not as lofty as others,
so my contribution will be, shall I say, more modest.
After I provide an overview of judicial modesty based on what the
Chief Justice and Judge Posner have said about it, I will address two
aspects of my work that provide opportunities to display judicial modesty.
First, I will address an aspect of the adjudicative work of the courts of
appeals: that is, our orders denying rehearing en banc and the routine
practice of filing dissenting opinions to accompany those orders. I will
argue that these opinions are inconsistent with judicial modesty. Second,
I will address a component of the administrative work of the federal
judiciary: that is, our policy about employing either term or career law
14. JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 285–86 (1996) (asterisk
and footnote omitted).
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clerks. I will argue that the policy recently adopted by the Judicial
Conference of the United States that limits federal judges to one career
clerk is consistent with judicial modesty.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE RUDIMENTS OF JUDICIAL MODESTY
Judge Posner embedded the phrase “judicial modesty” in our lexicon
when he published in the Harvard Law Review a critical review of the
2004 term of the Supreme Court.15 Posner entitled his essay “A Political
Court.”16 Judge Posner criticized the decision in Roper v. Simmons17 for
having “brushed aside Stanford v. Kentucky, which sixteen years earlier
had held that executing a sixteen- or seventeen-year-old does not violate
the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.”18 He faulted the
Court for having ignored the “rich statistical literature on the deterrent
effect of capital punishment.”19 He wrote that the decision in United States
v. Booker20 was “regrettable”21 because, in his view, “invalidating the
mandatory character of the Sentencing Guidelines”22 would not “yield a
net social benefit”23 and the mandatory guidelines “could not be thought
inconsistent with all reasonable understandings of the Sixth
Amendment.”24 He described as “injuriously unpragmatic,”25 the decision
in Clinton v. Jones,26 “in which the Supreme Court refused to grant
President Clinton immunity from Paula Jones’s suit for sexual harassment
until his term of office ended.”27 Posner thought it was “obvious . . . that
forcing the President to submit to a deposition in a case about his sexual
escapades would be political dynamite that would explode and interfere
with his ability to perform his duties.”28
Judge Posner also praised some of the decisions of the Supreme Court.
He described Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,29 in which “the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of a voucher system whereby public monies
are funneled to private schools, most of which are Catholic parochial
15. Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Foreword: A Political Court, 119
HARV. L. REV. 31 (2005).
16. Id.
17. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
18. Posner, supra note 15, at 42 (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989)).
19. Id. at 64.
20. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
21. Posner, supra note 15, at 60.
22. Id. at 59.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 60.
25. Id. at 92.
26. 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
27. Posner, supra note 15, at 92.
28. Id.
29. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
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schools,”30 as “a good pragmatic decision because it allowed a social
experiment.”31 He lauded the “pragmatic soundness”32 of Kelo v. City of
New London33 because “it tosse[d] the issue [of eminent domain] back into
the democratic arena.”34 Posner hailed the decisions allowing a display of
the Ten Commandments in Van Orden v. Perry35 and disallowing another
in McCreary County v. ACLU36 as a “sensible approach to dealing with
indeterminate legal questions charged with political passion.”37
Judge Posner explained the elements of judicial modesty by contrasting
“aggressive” and “modest” approaches to judging.38 The aggressive judge
“expands the Court’s authority relative to that of other branches of
government.”39 The modest judge “tells the Court to think very hard
indeed before undertaking to check actions by other branches of
government.”40
Posner also explained two “[f]ormulations of the modest approach.”41
The first is “James Bradley Thayer’s principle that statutes should be
invalidated only if they are contrary to any reasonable understanding of
the constitutional text.”42 The second is Justice Holmes’s “‘can’t helps,’
or ‘puke,’ test: a statute is unconstitutional only if it makes you want to
throw up.”43 Posner posited that “Thayer’s approach limits, it never
expands, judicial review”44 and “Holmes’s approach allows stretching the
constitutional text when necessary to avoid extreme injustice.”45
Posner concluded that the modest judge is a “timid politician,”46 and
Posner lamented, “Judicial modesty is not the order of the day in the
Supreme Court.”47 In several cases, “the Court should have stayed its hand
and allowed the challenged government officials to have their way.”48
30. Posner, supra note 15, at 90 (footnote omitted).
31. Id. at 92.
32. Id. at 98.
33. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
34. Posner, supra note 15, at 98.
35. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
36. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
37. Posner, supra note 15, at 102.
38. See id. at 54–60.
39. Id. at 54.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. (citing James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 138–52 (1893)).
43. Id. at 55 (citing Letter from Justice Holmes to Harold Laski (Jan. 11, 1929), in 2
HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 1124 (Mark Dewolfe Howe ed., 1953)).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 56.
48. Id. at 102.
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Posner called on the Court to “be restrained in the exercise of its power,
recognizing the subjective character, the insecure foundations, of its
constitutional jurisprudence.”49
Although Judge Posner’s explication of judicial modesty was confined
to the role of the Supreme Court in constitutional interpretation, he wrote
based “on the impressions that [he had] gleaned from being a federal
appellate judge for . . . twenty-four years.”50 The role of judicial review is
shared, after all, at all levels of the federal judiciary, and several aspects
of the federal judicial experience no doubt informed his perspective.
I recognize that Judge Posner “associate[s] judicial pragmatism with
judicial modesty[,]”51 and I do not endorse Posner’s conception of “the
pragmatic approach, which, . . . asks judges to focus on the practical
consequences of their decisions.”52 I consider myself to be a formalist or
what Judge Posner calls a “legalist.”53 Judge Posner sees a “convergence
between the pragmatic approach to constitutional adjudication and judicial
modesty,”54 but that convergence is irrelevant to the matters I will address.
Judge Posner’s published plea for judicial modesty was complemented
nicely that same year by the confirmation hearing on the nomination of
John Roberts to be Chief Justice. During the hearing, Roberts stated, “Like
most people, I resist the labels. I have told people when pressed that I
prefer to be known as a modest judge.”55 From his opening statement
through his answers to questions from senators of both political parties,
Roberts repeatedly referred to the need for judicial modesty.56 He
described the approach as not limited to the work of the Supreme Court
but as “good for the legal system as a whole.”57
Unlike Posner, Roberts used the language of a formalist, not a
pragmatist, in his opening statement, when he famously compared judges
to umpires at baseball games.58 He said,
Judges and Justices are servants of the law, not the other way
around. Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the
rules, they apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is
49. Id.
50. Id. at 34.
51. Id. at 102.
52. Id. at 90. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY
(2003).
53. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 7 (2008).
54. Posner, supra note 15, at 91.
55. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice of
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 158 (2005)
(statement of Judge John G. Roberts, Jr.).
56. Id. at 55, 158, 180, 251, 409.
57. Id. at 158.
58. Id. at 55.
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critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules, but it
is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the
umpire.59
Roberts then elaborated on that role.
Roberts explained that his perspective of modesty was shaped by his
experiences with the collegiality of a circuit court of appeals, where a
judge values the views of others.60 He said, “Part of that modesty has to do
with being open to the considered views of your colleagues on the
bench.”61 He praised “how valuable it is to function in a collegial way with
your colleagues on the bench, other judges being open to your views, you
being open to theirs.”62
Roberts also professed respect for precedent, which he described as
“shaped by other judges equally striving to live up to the judicial oath.”63
He appeared to understand the roles of precedent and collegiality as
related notions of “the modesty to be open in the decisional process to the
considered views of . . . colleagues.”64 He stated that “a modest approach
requires beginning with the body of precedent . . . and that’s a
recognition . . . we’re not smarter than our fathers who laid down this
precedent.”65 Roberts said, “Adherence to precedent promotes
evenhandedness, promotes fairness, promotes stability and
predictability . . . [which are] very important values in a legal system.”66
Roberts, like Posner, described judicial modesty as requiring respect
for the decisions of the political branches, but Roberts again addressed
judicial modesty in the vernacular of a formalist, not a pragmatist.67 He
stated that modesty “means an appreciation that the role of the judge is
limited . . . [judges are] to decide the cases before them, they’re not to
legislate, they’re not to execute the laws.”68 Roberts explained that, in the
exercise of judicial review, “the Court has to appreciate that the reason
they have that authority is because they’re interpreting the law, they’re not
making policy.”69 Roberts opined, “I don’t think the courts should have a
dominant role in society.”70

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
See id. at 158.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 55.
Id.
Id. at 409.
Id. at 180.
See id. at 158.
Id.
Id.
Id.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol60/iss5/1

8

Pryor: The Perspective of a Junior Circuit Judge on Judicial Modesty

D U N W O D Y D ISTIN G U ISH ED LECTU RE IN LAW

2008]

1015

Taken together, the descriptions of judicial modesty by Posner, the
pragmatist, and Roberts, the formalist, can be distilled into four elements.
First, the modest judge is restrained in the exercise of power; that is, the
modest judge avoids expressions that are unnecessary or without authority
when he resolves controversies. Second, the modest judge is reluctant to
interfere with the considered decisions of other legitimate authorities.
Third, the modest judge is respectful of precedent and judicial tradition.
Fourth, the modest judge appreciates the perspectives of colleagues as
equals.
Modesty improves judicial decisionmaking and enhances the security
of the judiciary in our constitutional structure. By exercising restraint, the
modest judge employs judicial power only when duty demands, thereby
reducing his risk of error. The deference of a modest judge enhances the
reputation of the judiciary in the eyes of authorities that are needed to
support the exercise of judicial power and that resent having their power
usurped. The modest judge’s respect for tradition strengthens the
legitimacy of the judiciary as a neutral guardian of law. The modest
judge’s appreciation for collegiality makes him more productive, careful,
and deliberative. Together these qualities remind us of Alexander
Hamilton’s description of the judiciary as the “least dangerous” branch
because it exercises “neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment.”71
II. MODESTY FOR A CIRCUIT JUDGE
Judicial modesty is relevant to more than constitutional adjudication.
Its qualities of restraint, deference, tradition, and collegiality are generally
applicable to several components of the judicial function. Although neither
the Chief Justice nor Judge Posner has suggested that judicial modesty is
relevant to the topics that I will address, they both have addressed judicial
modesty as pertaining to the adjudicative responsibilities of a judge.
Indeed, the Chief Justice did not limit his remarks about modesty to the
role of constitutional interpretation. Judge Posner also has written at length
about the reasons for and against writing dissents, and his perspective is
consonant with his call for modesty.72 Neither the Chief Justice nor Judge
Posner has addressed judicial modesty as pertaining to the administrative
responsibilities of judges, but the responsibility I will address—the
employment of law clerks—goes to the heart of the daily work of a judge
and is regulated by a policy recently adopted by the Judicial Conference.
It is also a subject that Judge Posner has reviewed critically elsewhere.73
In our daily grind at the circuit level, the topics I will address—dissents

71. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
72. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 353–59 (1996).
73. Id. at 139–59.
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from denials of rehearing en banc and hiring law clerks—are almost as
controversial as methods of constitutional interpretation.
A. The Immodest Dissent from a Denial of Rehearing En Banc
To explain why dissenting opinions from denials of rehearing en banc
are immodest, some background information about two matters is
necessary. The first matter is whether and when a judge should write a
dissenting opinion in the ordinary context of a decision by a panel of
judges. The second matter is the process for deciding whether to rehear an
appeal en banc and the process for deciding the appeal after rehearing is
granted.
1. The Costs and Benefits of Ordinary Dissent
The consensus of circuit judges is that, in the regular work of a
three-judge panel, a dissent should be reserved for an extraordinary
circumstance. Some evidence is circumstantial; in virtually any term of a
circuit court of appeals, the percentage of unanimous opinions is over
ninety-five percent. There is also direct evidence in the comments of
several judges. In a lecture several years ago, Judge Patricia Wald
explained, “Most judges dissent reluctantly. A dissent makes no new law;
it highlights one’s difference from a majority of colleagues, and it means
extra, self-assigned work.”74 The costs of dissent are so substantial that
Judge Frank Coffin advises, in his book about judging, that “each member
of an appellate court . . . give serious thought to when, why, and how to
indulge oneself in a separate opinion in order to minimize any corrosive
effect on underlying collegiality.”75 While she served as a member of the
D.C. Circuit, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg warned against frequent
dissents and suggested “that jurists in the United States might serve the
public better if they heightened their appreciation of the values so prized
in the civil law tradition: clarity and certainty in judicial
pronouncements.”76
Clarity was the goal of the great Chief Justice John Marshall. In the
early period of our Republic, the Supreme Court “followed the custom of
the King’s Bench and the other common law courts: each Justice filed his
own separate opinion.”77 Chief Justice Marshall “established the system
[the Court] currently use[s], whereunder one of the Justices announces an

74. Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1412 (1995).
75. FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 224–25 (1994).
76. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133, 150
(1990).
77. Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 1994 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 33, 34.
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opinion ‘for the Court.’”78 In the Marshall era, dissents “were very rare at
first.”79 Incidentally, as Justice Scalia has explained, Marshall’s custom
“made Thomas Jefferson furious[,] . . . [as] the Court continued to come
out with unanimous, pro-federal opinions written by Marshall”80 after
appointees by Presidents Jefferson and James Madison comprised a
majority of the Justices.81
There is good reason for refraining from writing a dissent even when
a judge thinks the majority is wrong. A cost-benefit analysis is
appropriate. As Judge Posner explained,
Suppose that although a judge thinks he is right and the
majority wrong, he also thinks it unlikely that his or any other
court will, or perhaps even should, reopen the question in the
foreseeable future. It may be one of those questions where it
is more important that the law be settled than that it be got
just right.82
Posner counsels against hasty dissent because it “will communicate a
sense of the law’s instability that is misleading; the decision is as solid a
precedent as if it had been unanimous.”83
A dissent, although fun to write, raises substantial costs for the
workloads of both the writer in the majority and the one in dissent. The
drafting process is more difficult for both writers, who must respond to
each other’s drafts while considering the perspective of the judge who is
not writing a draft. The costs are ordinarily outweighed by the benefits of
the better end product, but the costs are real. On the circuit court of
appeals, especially one with the heavy caseload of the Eleventh Circuit,
judges are sensitive to these costs.
There are benefits to dissents besides the benefit of producing a betterreasoned opinion for the majority. In a lecture to the Supreme Court
Historical Society, Justice Scalia explained that dissents “make[] it clear
that these decisions are the product of independent and thoughtful minds,
who try to persuade one another but do not simply ‘go along’ for some
supposed ‘good of the institution.’”84 Justice Scalia also explained,
When a judge of one of our Circuit Courts of Appeals
dissents from an opinion of his colleagues, he warns the
Courts of Appeals of the other twelve Circuits (who are not
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
POSNER, supra note 72, at 357.
Id.
Scalia, supra note 77, at 35.
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bound by the stare decisis effect of that opinion) that they
should not too readily adopt the same legal rule.85
Justice Scalia “agree[d] that unanimity helped produce greater public
acceptance”86 of the decision in Brown v. Board of Education,87 but he
argued that “artificial unanimity—the suppression of dissents—deprives
genuine unanimity of the great[er] force it can have when that force is
most needed.”88 I agree with that perspective, but I would respond to
Justice Scalia that too-frequent dissent may diminish the force of a
powerful dissent when it too is needed most.
I am an infrequent dissenter. In the more than four years that I have
served on the Eleventh Circuit, I have written one partial dissent in an en
banc appeal,89 which was joined by three colleagues; one dissent in a
published decision90 of a three-judge panel; and two partial dissents91 out
of the thousands of unpublished decisions of panels on which I have
served. None of those appeals involved the hot-button issues of our time.
The en banc partial dissent was about pleading securities fraud,92 and my
other published dissent was in a bankruptcy appeal.93 I dissented when my
conscience compelled me to explain why I thought the decision of the
majority was grievously wrong. There have been a few occasions when I
refrained from dissent because the issue was close, reasonable judges
could disagree, the precedent was workable, and the result was fair. In the
interest of full disclosure, I have written two majority opinions over
dissents in published decisions.94
Perhaps my perspective about dissents will change in time. Justice
Brennan delivered a lecture in the later part of his career entitled “In
Defense of Dissents.”95 He “confess[ed] that one reason [he] chose that
title is that the sixteen opinions [he] wrote some twenty-seven years
[earlier] during [his] first term on the Court did not include a single
dissent. Of [his] fifty-six opinions [in the term before his lecture], forty85. Id. at 36.
86. Id. at 35.
87. Id. (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
88. Id.
89. Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 500 F.3d 1293, 1300–03 (11th Cir. 2007) (en
banc) (Pryor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Black J., Marcus J., and
Wilson, J.).
90. In re Bracewell, 454 F.3d 1234, 1247–59 (11th Cir. 2006) (Pryor, J., dissenting).
91. Helms v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 222 F. App’x 821, 834–838 (11th Cir. 2007) (Pryor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Gary v. Modena, No. 05-16973, 2006 WL 3741364, at
*17–22 (11th Cir. Dec. 21, 2006) (Pryor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
92. See Weissman, 500 F.3d at 1300.
93. See Bracewell, 454 F.3d at 1247.
94. CSX Transp., Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 472 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2006), rev’d,
128 S. Ct. 467 (2007); Silva v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 448 F.3d 1229, 1233, 1244 (11th Cir. 2006).
95. William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427 (1986).
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two were dissents.”96 For now, my experience is more like the beginning
of Justice Brennan’s tenure on the Supreme Court; the decisions of the
Eleventh Circuit are usually agreeable to me. Justice Brennan also was in
a predicament different from mine. The likelihood of dissent on the
Supreme Court, which decides in a term fewer than 100 close cases that
have already divided the courts of appeals, is far higher than on the circuit
court of appeals, which decides in a term thousands of appeals, many of
which are simple.
2. The Costs and Benefits of Rehearing En Banc
Now consider the en banc process, which is reserved for the aberrant
circumstance of a rehearing that is “necessary to secure or maintain
uniformity”97 of decisions by the court or “involves a question of
exceptional importance.”98 An en banc hearing is “not favored”99 because
it imposes the heaviest cost on the workload of any court. After a threejudge panel has already incurred the substantial cost of reading the briefs,
hearing oral arguments, reviewing the record, and writing an opinion,
every judge of the court must repeat that process when an appeal is reheard
en banc.
The process for deciding whether to rehear an appeal en banc also
consumes substantial resources. Typically, a member of the circuit court
who was not on the panel that decided the appeal asks the clerk to
withhold issuance of the mandate until further notice.100 That judge then
writes a memorandum to the panel, with copies to every other member of
the court, explaining why the judge objects to the decision of the panel and
asking the panel to reconsider its decision. The panel responds, and if all
goes badly, after a series of memoranda, the judge who held the mandate
asks the Chief Judge to conduct a poll of the entire court to decide whether
to rehear the appeal en banc. For the court to grant rehearing, a majority
must vote for it.
If the court decides not to rehear the appeal en banc, then the Chief
Judge enters an order that announces that decision. With increasing
frequency over the last few decades, that order often is accompanied by
one or more dissenting opinions and perhaps an opinion that concurs in the
denial of rehearing en banc. The dissenting opinions ordinarily argue that
the panel decision is wrong. The question I will address is why that kind
of dissenting opinion is different from the ordinary dissent.

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)(1).
FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)(2).
FED. R. APP. P. 35(a).
See 11TH CIR. R. 35, I.O.P. 4–9.
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3. The Immodesty of a Dissent from Denial of Rehearing En Banc
A dissent from a denial of rehearing en banc is immodest. It is not an
exercise of judicial restraint. It is not deferential toward legitimate
authorities. It is not respectful of precedent and judicial tradition. It
undermines collegiality.
A dissent from a denial of rehearing is not restrained because it is
written by a judge who has no authority to decide that appeal. The only
members of the court who have the authority and responsibility to decide
that appeal are the members of the three-judge panel that actually decided
the appeal. This kind of dissent is unlike the dissent of a judge who is a
member of the panel that decided the appeal; the panel dissenter has a duty
to express his opinion when the panel has reached a clearly wrong
decision.
The dissenter from a denial of rehearing en banc is at a disadvantage
in second-guessing the decision of the judges who had the authority to
decide the appeal. The dissenter has studied the issue presented by the
appeal, but the dissenter has not had the benefit of the ordinary process of
deliberation and decision. The dissenter has not attended oral argument
and asked probing questions of counsel.
When a judge has the authority to decide an appeal, he participates in
a deliberative process that makes him better equipped to reach the correct
decision, especially in a difficult appeal about an important issue that the
court has decided to rehear en banc. After the panel has exercised its
authority to reach a decision and the entire court has had the opportunity
to consider that decision and the internal memoranda about whether to
rehear the appeal en banc, the real work begins. The Chief Judge appoints
a member of the original panel and a critic of the decision of the panel to
serve as case managers who then define the issues presented, often in
better terms than the lawyers who argued the appeal the first time. The
briefs filed before the en banc court are often better than the original briefs
because the attorneys are getting a second chance. The en banc process
also is more likely to attract helpful briefs of amici curiae. The oral
arguments are usually better in this second go-around. Most of all, the
deliberation by an en banc court is much better than the ordinary
deliberation of a three-judge panel. When the exceptional lawyers who are
judges of a circuit court focus on a single or few appeals in a week set
aside for en banc rehearings, the quality of their deliberation is higher than
the conferences of a three-judge panel that hears fifteen to twenty appeals
in a week of oral arguments.
The process for deciding an appeal en banc makes a difference because
it often changes minds. I have held a mandate, written in support of
rehearing, and then, after rehearing, decided that the panel decision was
correct after all. I have participated in an en banc rehearing in which the
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court discovered a basis for a unanimous decision based on an aspect of
the record that had been overlooked by both the panel and the member of
the court who asked for a poll to rehear the appeal. I have witnessed an
author of a panel decision change his mind after en banc rehearing. I have
also held a mandate, argued for rehearing, and narrowly lost a vote to
rehear the appeal en banc, but I have refused to file a dissenting opinion
from the order denying rehearing.
When a judge dissents from an order denying rehearing en banc and
expresses an opinion about how that appeal should have been decided, the
dissenter writes both without the authority to decide that appeal and
without the benefit of the reliable process for deciding an issue worthy of
en banc rehearing. Flying solo in this circumstance increases the risk of
error. That act is not restrained. It is more like having a scholar-inresidence provide academic criticism of the court, but that function is
supposed to be performed externally by law professors and law reviews,
not by judges.
One harsh critic of dissents from denials of rehearing en banc,
Professor David McGowan, refuses to call these dissents “opinions”; he
instead “call[s] them ‘en banc missives.’”101 He argues, “They are the
judicial equivalent of a press release, or an open letter to the readers of the
Federal Reporter.”102 He urges judges to use “law-school lectures . . . [for]
abstract judicial rumination.”103 I am trying to follow his advice here.
Professor McGowan’s objections remind me of a recent controversy
from my home state of Alabama when a member of the Supreme Court of
Alabama, Justice Tom Parker, published an op-ed in The Birmingham
News104 that lambasted his colleagues for faithfully applying the decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States in Roper v. Simmons.105 Justice
Parker was disqualified from participating in the decision because he had
represented the State as an attorney in an earlier stage of the litigation.106
His op-ed was roundly and correctly criticized107 for suggesting that the
101. David McGowan, Judicial Writing and the Ethics of the Judicial Office, 14 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 509, 576 (2001).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 581.
104. Tom Parker, Op-Ed., Alabama Justices Surrender to Judicial Activism, BIRMINGHAM
NEWS, Jan. 1, 2005, at 4B.
105. Id. (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)).
106. Id. (citing Ex parte Adams, 955 So. 2d 1106, 1107 (Ala. 2005)).
107. See, e.g., William H. Pryor Jr., Not-So-Serious Threats to Judicial Independence, 93 VA.
L. REV. 1759, 1775–76 (2007) (noting that Parker’s “twisted ideas of opposing activist decisions
by defying judicial decrees” failed when he was subsequently “trounced” in a Republican primary
for Chief Justice of Alabama); Sandra Day O’Connor, Op-Ed., The Threat to Judicial
Independence, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2006, at A18 (describing Parker’s reinterpretation of the
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause as “bold” and troublesome); William H. Pryor Jr., Op-Ed.,
Neither Force Nor Will, But Merely Judgment, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2006, at A14 (noting that
Parker “catisgated his colleagues for following the ruling of the Supreme Court”); Tony Mauro,
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state supreme court should not have followed the precedent of the
Supreme Court of the United States, but that nonsense was not the only
problem. It also was unseemly for a judge who had no authority to decide
an appeal to publish an op-ed that attacked the decision of his colleagues,
but that op-ed, I submit, was not altogether different from a dissent from
a denial of rehearing en banc.
The dissent from a denial of rehearing en banc is not respectful of
legitimate authorities, precedent, or judicial tradition. The dissent does not
respect the decision of the original panel, which now represents the
binding precedent for the circuit. The dissent does not respect the
considered decision of the full court not to rehear the appeal. The dissent
does not respect the time-honored rules of procedure that provide a
legitimate but limited process for allowing all members to decide an
exceptional appeal.
The first critic of en banc missives was one of the judicial legends of
the last century. In 1960, Judge Henry Friendly of the Second Circuit
wrote an objection to this practice that was joined by his colleague, Chief
Judge Lumbard.108 Judge Friendly wrote,
We feel obliged to note that the course which has brought this
to us would mean that any active judge may publish a dissent
from any decision, although he did not participate in it and
the Court has declined to review it en banc thereafter, a
practice which seems to us of dubious policy especially since,
if the issue is of real importance, further opportunities for
expression will assuredly occur.109
In 1992, Judge Raymond Randolph of the D.C. Circuit, a former clerk
to Judge Friendly, agreed with his former boss and wrote that “denials of
rehearing en banc are best followed by silence. They should not serve as
the occasion for an exchange of advisory opinions, overtures to the
Supreme Court, or press releases.”110
Since Judge Friendly’s early protest, en banc missives have appeared
with such increasing frequency that one could argue that these missives
are now the established tradition.111 After all, both the leading advocates
Alabama Judge Declares War on U.S. Supreme Court, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 3, 2006,
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1141293914878 (quoting one of Parker’s fellow justices,
who remarked that “Parker’s column was ‘an unprecedented attack by a member of the Supreme
Court on each fellow justice and an attack on the court as an institution’”).
108. United States v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R., 276 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1959)
(Friendly, J., concurring in denial of reh’g en banc, joined by Lumbard, C.J.), overruled in part by
Chappell & Co. v. Frankel, 367 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1966).
109. Id. at 553.
110. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am. v. Clarke, 965 F.2d 1077, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (statement
of Randolph, J.).
111. See Indraneel Sur, How Far Do Voices Carry: Dissents from Denial of Rehearing En
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for judicial modesty, Chief Justice Roberts, when he was a circuit judge,112
and Judge Posner,113 and many other distinguished jurists have published
en banc missives. Even the circuit judge for whom I clerked, John Minor
Wisdom, published an en banc missive.114
The best reply to that argument I can offer is twofold. First, I am glad
to follow in any tradition that Judge Friendly started. Judge Wisdom once
wrote, in a tribute to Judge Friendly, “Within my lifetime, except for the
giants (Holmes, Brandeis, and Cardozo) and possibly Learned Hand, no
federal appellate judge has commanded more respect for his opinions and
his writings than Henry Friendly.”115 I would add to Judge Wisdom’s
observation that Chief Justice Roberts began his distinguished career as a
law clerk to Judge Friendly. Second, there are many distinguished federal
judges, besides Judge Randolph, who still do not file en banc missives and,
although their silence is understandably less noticed, their good example
is worth emulating.
The last thing I would add is that en banc missives do not promote
collegiality. After a circuit court has expended considerable resources and
declined to rehear an appeal en banc, the author of a missive spends even
more of our most precious resource—time—drafting the missive.
Sometimes other judges respond to the missive and spend considerable
time on that exercise. I have done it reluctantly when I served on the
original panel.116 I have defended the panel decision against
misconstruction because attorneys are prone to citations of missives in
briefs and petitions, and the concurring opinion sets the record straight as
it is printed after the order of denial of rehearing and immediately before
the missive.
An age of judicial modesty should mean fewer en banc missives.
Orders denying rehearing en banc would be important to the litigants, but
not opportunities for judicial grandstanding. Criticism would come from
the Bar and scholars while the judiciary would move on to the appeals of
other litigants. The duty of the judiciary is to resolve the disputes of those
Banc, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1315, 1317 (“[D]issents from denial of rehearing en banc are now
routine . . . .”).
112. Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc).
113. Wallace v. City of Chi., 440 F.3d 421, 430–34 (7th Cir. 2006) (Posner, J., dissenting from
denial of reh’g en banc).
114. Novak v. Beto, 456 F.2d 1303, 1304–09 (5th Cir. 1972) (Wisdom, J., dissenting from
denial of reh’g en banc, joined by Goldberg, J., and Simpson, J.).
115. John Minor Wisdom, Views of a Friendly Observer, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 63, 63–64 (1984).
116. United States v. Williams, 472 F.3d 835, 835 (11th Cir. 2006) (Black, J., concurring in
denial of reh’g en banc, joined by Carnes, J., Marcus, J., and Pryor, J.); Underwood v. Perry County
Comm’n, 452 F.3d 1258, 1259 (11th Cir. 2006) (Carnes, J., and Pryor, J., concurring in denial of
reh’g en banc); United States v. Levy, 391 F.3d 1327, 1328 (11th Cir. 2004) (Hull, J., concurring
in denial of reh’g en banc, joined by Anderson, J., Carnes, J., and Pryor, J.).
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litigants, and the litigants should not be used as pawns for publishing
op-eds disguised as judicial opinions.
B. The Modest Limitation of Career Law Clerks
In contrast with the immodesty of en banc missives, the federal
judiciary recently has promoted judicial modesty on the administrative
front. Last year, as part of a long-term strategy of cost containment, the
Judicial Conference adopted a policy that limits every federal judge to the
employment of no more than one career law clerk.117 All other law clerks
must be employed for a term of one or a few years.118 I am a member of
the Judicial Resources Committee, which recommended this policy to the
Conference.119 The proposal generated substantial controversy120 but was
adopted by a wide margin of the Judicial Conference.121
Because it is administrative, the new policy about hiring law clerks
cannot be evaluated for judicial modesty in the same way that an
adjudicative policy can be evaluated. A judge’s administrative
responsibilities are different but not separate from the process of
adjudication. Administrative policies still affect adjudication, inter-branch
conflict, and collegiality. We should evaluate an administrative policy for
modesty based on its use of judicial resources and its effect, however
indirect, on adjudication.
Several years ago, Judge Posner wrote candidly about the adjudicative
costs of the rise of the law clerk in the federal judiciary.122 He explained
that the increased reliance on law clerks for the drafting of opinions makes
judicial opinions more uniform in style,123 longer,124 less candid,125 and less
credible.126 He lamented some aspects of this increased “bureaucracy”127
but acknowledged, “The law clerk is here to stay.”128
117. Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 24–27 (Sept.
18, 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judconf/proceedingsSept07.pdf.
118. Id. at 26.
119. Id. at 21; Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Resources to the Chief
Justice of the United States and Members of the Judicial Conference of the United States 32–34,
Appendix B-21-31 (Sept. 2007); see also Cost Containment and the Federal Judiciary, THE THIRD
BRANCH, Oct. 2007, http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/2007-10/cost/index.html.
120. Pamela A. MacLean, Law Clerk Cost-Cutting Has Judges Up in Arms, NAT’L L.J., Sept.
4, 2007, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005557087.
121. See Joe Palazzolo, Judicial Conference Votes to Curb Career Clerks, LEGAL TIMES, Sept.
19, 2007, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005557386.
122. See POSNER, supra note 72, at 139–59.
123. Id. at 145–46.
124. Id. at 146–47.
125. Id. at 147–48.
126. Id. at 148–49.
127. Id. at 156.
128. Id. at 158.
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The policy of relying primarily on term, not career, law clerks should
limit the costs identified by Judge Posner and contain the exercise of
judicial power. A regular turnover in less experienced law clerks will
require circuit and district judges to spend more of their time crafting
judicial opinions. When there is a regular turnover of law clerks who work
for brief terms, judges necessarily will rely on them primarily for research
and drafting. The new policy will make less likely the reliance on career
staff to perform the judicial role. Term law clerks also are bureaucrats but,
as Judge Posner described them, “fortunately, industrious and highly
intelligent ones”129 less prone to the staleness of an entrenched
bureaucracy. A predominance of term clerks is more likely to maintain this
beneficial character.
The new policy of limiting career law clerks also is an exercise of
fiscal restraint. Career law clerks are costly. Their annual salaries are
ordinarily around $100,000,130 and career clerks are “eligible to participate
in all benefit programs offered to judiciary employees, including health,
dental, vision, and life insurance coverage, retirement benefits, judiciary
supplemental benefit programs and the Thrift Savings Plan.”131 Term
clerks are paid annual salaries of $50,000 to $80,000132 and are not
allowed most other employee benefits.
This policy of fiscal restraint is respectful of the legitimate needs of
other authorities within and without the judiciary. “[T]here has been
substantial growth in the number of career law clerks,”133 but the costs of
judicial chambers are not the only cost of the judiciary. There are court
clerk’s offices, unit executives, probation services, libraries, rent,
construction of new buildings, and other expenses. Stewardship regarding
the costs of chambers frees resources for the other responsibilities of the
federal judiciary. Cost containment for the judiciary also assists Congress
and the Executive in managing the federal budget in a time of war and
budget deficits. This stewardship also may assist the Chief Justice in his
effort to persuade Congress to increase judicial salaries.134
The curtailment of career clerks respects judicial tradition. “The hiring
of distinguished recent law school graduates to serve as federal judges’
law clerks for a year or two became the general practice in the 1930s.”135
“The Judicial Conference officially recognized career law clerks in
129. Id. at 156.
130. Palazollo, supra note 121.
131. Online System for Clerkship Application and Review, Qualifications, Salary and
Benefits, http://oscar.dcd.uscourts.gov/law-clerk-benefits.
132. Palazzolo, supra note 121.
133. Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States, supra note 117,
at 26.
134. John G. Roberts, Jr., 2006 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, THE THIRD
BRANCH, Jan. 2007, http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/2007-01/2006/index.html.
135. POSNER, supra note 72, at 139.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2008

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 5 [2008], Art. 1

1026

FLO RID A LAW REVIEW

[V ol. 60

1968,”136 but “[i]n 1978 the Judicial Conference adopted a resolution
stating that the best interests of the judiciary are served through
continuation of the traditional practice of appointing recent graduates as
law clerks for periods of one to two years.”137 That tradition serves the
judiciary well, as the brightest of recent graduates of American law
schools spend a year or two employed in public service at modest salaries.
Many federal judges began their careers this way; half the current active
judges of the Eleventh Circuit, for example, started their legal careers as
term law clerks in the federal judiciary. This tradition serves the interests
of the Bar, as law clerks soon become leading practitioners, and those
leading practitioners in turn become influential ambassadors for the
federal judiciary. This tradition also serves the interests of law schools, as
top graduates are hired by judges and former clerks become professors.
The limitation of career law clerks promotes collegiality by treating
judges as equals. One of the problems of allowing multiple career law
clerks per chambers is “greater disparity in costs from one chambers to
another.”138 The policy of allowing one career clerk per chambers reduces
that disparity, but it allows bankruptcy judges and magistrate judges, who
have small staffs and a smaller pool from which to hire, the benefit of a
career law clerk. The policy also allows the senior judges in the circuit and
district courts to employ a career clerk for their smaller staffs. These semiretired judges perform substantial work for the judiciary, but they too hire
from a smaller labor pool. Active Article III judges, who employ multiple
clerks, in contrast, will be served well by continuing to draw from a
national pool of top talent.
III. CONCLUSION
In 1996, Judge Posner wrote that we “may be living in the golden age
of the federal appellate judiciary. There may never have been a time when
so large a fraction of federal judges were outstanding.”139 In 2008, it is still
yet to be seen whether this golden age will be recognized also as an age of
judicial modesty. To achieve that end, judges will all need to learn from
the examples of the giants of the last century like Judge Friendly. Their
examples of judicial restraint, deference to other legitimate authorities,
respect for precedent and judicial tradition, and commitment to collegiality
light our path. The time for following their examples is ripe.

136. Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Resources, supra note 119, at
Appendix B-22.
137. Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States, supra note 117,
at 26.
138. Id.
139. POSNER, supra note 72, at 150.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol60/iss5/1

20

